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AbSTrAcT
For some time now, the difficulties in consolidating the MERCOSUR are 
no longer new. Today, economic and political instabilities appear to be the 
only sustainable and common facet in Latin American countries. Therefore, it is 
interesting to discuss with some evidence whether MERCOSUR is an institution 
that evolves consistently with its objectives despite the circumstances, or 
whether MERCOSUR is just a set of countries that like leaves pile up according 
to wind and luck. We addressed the periodization of MERCOSUR’s lifetime 
based on a new approach. The main contribution of this paper is a precise 
delimitation of the stages in the evolution of the MERCOSUR from a method 
that reduces the risk of diverse types of biases. In fact, we showed evidence in 
favor of the first characterization, but the second prevails.




Desde hace tiempo a esta parte, no son nuevas las dificultades que enfrenta 
el MERCOSUR para consolidarse. Hoy en día, las inestabilidades políticas y 
económicas parecen ser las únicas facetas comunes y sustentables de los 
países latinoamericanos. Por lo tanto, resulta interesante discutir en base a la 
evidencia si el MERCOSUR es una institución que evoluciona consistentemente 
con sus objetivos a pesar de las circunstancias, o si el MERCOSUR es solo un 
conjunto de países que, como las hojas, se amontonan de acuerdo al viento 
y la suerte. Para ello, se propone una periodización basada en un nuevo 
enfoque. La principal contribución del artículo es una delimitación precisa de 
la evolución del MERCOSUR a partir de un método que reduce el riesgo de 
cometer diferentes tipos de sesgos. De hecho, se ofrece evidencia a favor de la 
primera caracterización, aunque la segunda es la que prevalece.
Palabras clave: periodización, técnicas multivariantes, integración regional, 
regionalismo, MERCOSUR.
Clasificación JEL / JEL clasification: F15, C14, N46, N76.
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1. inTroducTion
The tree forges its destiny from the root and despite the hostility of the 
environment or its own weaknesses. On the floor, the leaves swirl with the 
wind, at times deceptively so well stacked that seems the result of their own 
will.
For some time now, the difficulties in consolidating the MERCOSUR are 
no longer new. Even in several moments, the debate seemed exhausted and 
the events presaged the end of the treaty. Today, when economic and political 
instabilities appear to be the only sustainable and common facet in Latin 
American countries, it is interesting to try to answer the following question. Is 
the MERCOSUR an institution that evolves, like the tree, consistently with its 
objectives despite the circumstances, or is MERCOSUR just a set of countries 
that like the leaves pile up according to wind and luck?
The main purpose is to respond to that question based on the periodization 
of MERCOSUR’s evolution. Periodization is the process of categorizing the past 
into discrete, quantified named blocks of time in order to facilitate the study 
and analysis of history (Rabinowitz, 2014). However, our perception could 
be affected by the changes of scenarios, our reaction to the temperament 
of the politicians and the mood of the citizens, and even according to our 
own personal history. In order to simplify the problem of the neutrality, we 
approached the issue quantitatively from a new periodization proposal. We 
used an alternative method of periodization that consists in characterizing and 
grouping the time units according to relatively stable characteristics associated 
to appropriate indicators. 
Our work used statistical information related to the evolution of the trade 
flows between the founding countries of MERCOSUR for the period 1983-
2015, and the decomposition of the Kojima’s intensity indicator proposed by 
Drysdale (1969). We determined the periodization taking the time units (1983 
to 2015) as the described variable and through a combination of K-means 
clustering and MANOVA on the set of indicators of geographical bias. The main 
contribution of this paper is a precise delimitation of the stages in the evolution 
of the MERCOSUR from a method that reduces the risk of diverse types of 
biases, and based on bilateral trade statistics that are jointly determined by 
complementarity and institutional factors.
The following section is divided into two parts. The first part describes 
MERCOSUR briefly and presents some periodizations of its evolution proposed 
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by specialists. The second part shows the indicator and its decomposition, the 
multivariate techniques and the data sources, in that order. The third section 
provides the results and the four section discuss it with the literature. Fourth 
section presents the final considerations.
2. MercoSur review And eMPiricAl APProAch
2.1. mercosur
Despite the fact that a trade agreement between Argentina and Brazil was 
a repeated proposal since Bunge’s reconsideration of the Union Aduanera 
del Sur (Bunge, 1929), it began to take shape between the years 1983 to 
1985. During this period, both countries recovered their democracy after 
several years of military intervention, but faced the urgency of reorienting 
their economies given the enormous weight of the external debt, the lack of 
international financing, and the need to make large investments to modernize 
their economies and face global competition. The governments of both 
countries believed that the development path would only be possible if they 
take it associated.
According to Caetano (2011), there is a history of MERCOSUR prior 
to the 1991 founding treaty. The Foz de Iguaçu Act of November 1985, 
signed by presidents Sarney for Brazil and Alfonsín for Argentina, 
synthesized that sort of prehistory of MERCOSUR. During the following 
year, both presidents took a further step forward with the signing of two 
central acts: the first was the PICE (Programa de Integración y Cooperación 
Económica Argentina-Brasil), an attempt to achieve a gradual and flexible 
trade convergence between both countries vis-à-vis third markets. The 
second was the Argentina-Brazil Friendship Act: Democracy, Peace and 
Development, which manifested the political will to ensure the success of 
that agenda. 
In 1988 Brazil and Argentina accepted Uruguay’s incorporation into the 
integration process through the Alborada Act. Paraguay, on the other hand, 
maintained stable political and economic relations with Brazil from the 
negotiations for the construction of the binational Itaipú dam. In contrast, 
relations between Argentina and Paraguay were tense during the Alfonsín 
period, a situation that did not change until 1989 when Paraguay recovered 
its democracy. 
Accompanying the new ideological wave and convinced of the need to 
deepen the process, Menem for Argentina and Collor de Mello for Brazil signed 
the Buenos Aires Act in 1990, an agreement that promised a common market 
formed by both economies. The Treaty of Asunción, signed in 1991 by the 
previous presidents, as well as Rodríguez for Paraguay and Lacalle for Uruguay, 
finally redefined that area and created the MERCOSUR.  
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Between MERCOSUR specialists (about which we will return in the 
discussion section) there is agreement in pointing the sub-period 1991-1994, 
that is from the Treaty of Asunción to the Ouro Preto Protocol, as the initial 
stage of MERCOSUR, and the sub-period 1994-1998 as the “age of gold” or 
“apogee” in trading terms. While in the first one the gradual, automatic and 
linear dismantling of the tariff restrictions on the exchange of goods was 
“successful”, during the next one the common external tariff was established 
and there were some significant legal advances -mainly, the international legal 
status-.
However, some authors agreed that, during this second stage, “the gap 
between the commitments adopted and their effective implementation was 
increasing” (Bouzas 2001), and trading success was due to the momentum 
generated by the private sector. In fact, Botto (2015) characterized the sub-
period 1995-2002 as “institutional deconstruction”.
There are differences in marking the end of the golden stage or “Phoenician 
MERCOSUR” (Caetano 2011), despite agreeing that the devaluation of the 
Real in Brazil in 1999 was critical. That year started a stage of “turbulence” and 
“crisis” in which the four countries appealed to unilateral decisions, safeguards 
or bilateral negotiations. According to Caetano, governments did not have the 
political margin to redirect the integration process. However, the alarm about 
the progress transcended governments and the most affected interest groups 
explicitly demanded greater coordination and compliance with the treaty 
signed (Cimadamore 2001).
During 2000, several agreements tried to strengthen the customs union 
both internally and externally. The called “Mercosur Re-launch” program caused 
favorable expectations for a while. However, according to Caetano, it was not 
until the Convertibility crisis in Argentina, and the consequent 2002 Uruguayan 
crisis, that governments were not aware of the strong interdependence and the 
need to generate instruments for coordination of economic policies. The year 
2002 seems to be an inflection point because there were some seemingly 
coincidental phenomena: the pro-MERCOSUR interest of the Brazilian and 
Argentine governments, the compatibility of their exchange rate regimes, and 
the need to negotiate jointly in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the World 
Trade Organization and with the European Union given the individual weakness 
of the four economies (Caetano 2011).
This renewed political impulse gave rise to a “social, productive and 
citizens” MERCOSUR (Perrotta and Porcelli 2016). There were institutional 
advances in dispute resolution, policy coordination and social cooperation, 
the inclusion of consultative forums with sub-national actors and forums 
for productive integration and support policies for small and medium-
sized enterprises, together with the creation of the MERCOSUR Structural 
Convergence Fund (FOCEM, as per its initials in Spanish) and the MERCOSUR 
Parliament (PARLASUR). In addition, between 2002 and 2006, an unusually 
benign international environment with cheap credits and record commodities 
prices boosted the growth of the region’s economies.
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However, MERCOSUR continued with internal problems. Malamud (2008: 
131) stated that during periods with very low interdependence between 
MERCOSUR partners, the governments were able to agree. However, when the 
interdependence was greater and it had to be administered, getting consensus 
was harder. The lack of supranational institutions to which governments 
delegate policy decisions generated an implementation gap. Thus, “excess 
of rhetoric” (Malamud 2009) and regional conflicts coincided temporarily, 
for example the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay about pulp mill 
(“pastera”, in Spanish) at Uruguay River.
In spite of that “ideological redirection”, in the opinion of Botto (2015: 
35), MERCOSUR did not show important institutional changes. She stated, 
“Despite the promise to create regional funds, the leading governments 
maintained their resistance to delegate resources and power to supranational 
institutions, the advances in the agendas were manifested in actions mainly 
in administrative coordination, and the inclusion of civil society actors was 
reduced to technical assistance”. Caetano (2019: 61) affirmed that, despite 
the partial achievements, “neither convergence nor much less this pattern 
of post-liberal programmatic regionalism could advance in facts despite the 
ideological affinity.” 
This description of MERCOSUR, which seems coherent, actually includes 
the opinions of authors with significant differences in their assessment of its 
political evolution. In addition, there is no agreement on the precise delimitation 
of the sub-periods, although in general terms they seem to coincide. The 
methodology presented below rectifies this situation.
2.2. methodology
Changes in trade flows between two countries may be due to changes 
in the importance of other economies in the world market, changes in 
complementarity between the patterns of specialization, and other reasons 
that generate or eliminate bias between them. To eliminate the third parties 
influences and focus attention on the country specific factors, it is advisable 
to use the trade intensity indicator proposed by Kojima (1964). This indicator 
is:
       (1)
where i,j PÎ  with P as country set, Xij is the export flow from i to j, Xi is the i’s 
total exports, Mj, Mk are the j’s total imports and world’s imports, respectively. 
Then, xij is the relevance of country j’s imports on the i’s total exports, and mj 
is the relevance of j’s imports on the world imports (net of i’s imports).
ij i ij
ij
j k jk i
X /X x
I = =
M / M m
¹å
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A value of ijI  equal to the unit denotes geographical neutrality, that is, for 
i’s exports, market j represents exactly the same as what market j represents 
for world supply. On the other hand, if it is greater (lesser) than the unit, it 
indicates that market j has a greater (lesser) relevance in terms of market share 
than it should have according to that criterion, so the existence of geographical 
bias is evidenced in favor of (against) integration between i and j countries1. 
Therefore, an increase (decrease) in the value of ijI when it is above the unit 
indicates that the geographical bias in favor of trade integration between the 
two economies has increased (decreased) 2. If the initial value of ijI  is below 
the unit, an increase (decrease) denotes the reduction (extension) of the bias 
against integration between the two economies.
Drysdale (1969) proposed the decomposition of the Kojima indicator to 
identify the origin of the geographical bias, demonstrating that it is possible to 
re-express ijI  as the product between a complementarity index and an index 
of non-complementarity or unexplained bias. The first shows whether the 
similarity between i’s basket of exportable goods and the j’s basket of imports 
is greater than that between the latter and the global basket of exportable 
goods. In contrast, the remaining bias index indicates the degree of resistance 
faced by i’s exports in the j’s market in relation to the average resistance that 
faces in the rest of the global market. Drysdale and Garnaut (1982: 62) defined 
“resistance” as any factor that prevents or delays immediate movements in 
response to price differentials of tradable goods. They differentiated between 
objective and subjective resistances. While the first is a set of obstacles that 
can be overcome by assuming a monetary cost (distance, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, etc.), the second one is a set of difficulties that arise from the fact that 
entrepreneurs have imperfect information when they make business decisions.
Thus, if Cij is the complementarity index and Bij is the index of unexplained 
bias, then  
ij ij ijI = C B , with
      (2)
1 Due to this interpretation, Frankel (1997) called it concentration rate. Instead, Petri (2016) 
interpreted it as a particular indicator of the degree of interdependence.
2 The formula shows that the increase in geographical bias may be due to the increase in export flows 
from i to j, accompanied by a minor (or null) increase in total imports of j, what is interpreted as a 
displacement of products originating in third countries by the partner’s products. On the other hand, 
we interpret the increase in the participation of j in the exports of i with constant Iij, as the natural 
result of the growth of the share of the partner in world trade (Cordero and González 2018).
s s ss
j i jsi
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where     (3)
xis is the share of good s in the i’s exports (=Xis/Xi), mjs is the share of 
good s in the j’s imports (=Mjs/Mj), and tws is the share of good s in the world 
imports (net of the i’s imports).
Then, the complementarity index is the multiplication between the i’s 
comparative advantages index and the j’s comparative disadvantages index. 
The greater the coincidence between the exportable supply of a country and 
the demand for imports of its partner, the greater the tendency to trade among 
them, that is, the value of trade approximates the potential bilateral trade 
explained by the complementarities between the partners.
The index of unexplained bias is equal to the ratio between the observed 
intensity (I) and the intensity explained by the complementarity (C), therefore:
      (4)
The numerator of the expression on the right is the i’s total export to 
country j, and the denominator is the weighted sum of i’s exports of good s to 
country j, where the weight is the j’s participation in world imports of goods.
Anderson and Garnaut (1985), Hill (1985), Anderson and Nordheim (1993) 
and Petri (2006) addressed this decomposition in the context of different 
trade intensity studies. Terra (1999), Vaillant (2001), Aminian et al. (2008), 
Álvarez (2011), Aponte Jaramillo et al. (2012), Cordero and González (2018) 
did so in studies on Latin America. Iapadre and Plummer (2011) discussed 
the properties of the indicator and proposed variants with applications for 
different regions, including MERCOSUR. In addition, Edmonds and Li (2010) 
integrated this indicator with the empirical specifications of the gravitational 
model of trade.
We treated time units as observations or subjects of analysis. The 
intention was to group the years according to the similarities in the bias 
indexes mentioned above. We use the complementarity index and the index 
of unexplained bias instead of the aggregate trade intensity indicator because 
this way we obtain greater analytical capacity and we make better use of 
the descriptive power of the clustering techniques by having another source 
of variability in the elements to be grouped. We used two complementary 
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We grouped the years using clustering techniques, in particular, K-means. 
The number of clusters is not a trivial decision and generally results the most 
controversial. We used two techniques: the amount of explained variance as 
criterion and the elbow method for determining the break (Kassambara 2017), 
and the gap statistic (Tibshirani et al. 2001). 
Then, we performed a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to 
verify if the differences in variance between groups are statistically significant 
(Rencher and Christensen 2012). This stage is not redundant. Although, in the 
previous step, we determined clusters that minimize intra-group variance and 
maximize inter-group ones, the lack of significance in a MANOVA is sufficient 
evidence of forced periodization.
The source for bilateral trade flows is the World Integrated Trade Solutions 
(WITS) database. The series are expressed in value and for industries at one-
digit ISIC code3. The application has been concentrated on Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. These countries signed the Asunción Treaty in 1991 
and are States Parties of MERCOSUR since then4. However, the sample includes 
the years from 1983 for the reasons mentioned in the previous section, and 
finalized in 2015 for data availability.
We used the raw data to compute the indicators following expressions 
(1) and (2). Each exporting country had three importing countries, and each 
binomial had two bias indexes. Then, 24 series characterized each unit of 
time.
The number of clusters was determined using R with the factoextra, clusterR 
and cluster packages, and we used Stata for the MANOVA estimation.
Finally, it is necessary to clarify the way in which we have interpreted 
the results in order to meet our objective. Two possible scenarios raise: The 
first, the unambiguous deepening of the integration process that is favorably 
reflected in bilateral trade flows. The deepening of a trade agreement 
consolidates asymmetries in the treatment of imports in favor of the 
partners. From this situation, there is a margin for changes in the patterns 
of specialization with a tendency to strengthen complementary productive 
structures and intra-industrial trade. If this were the case, following Frankel 
and Rose (1996), we would see a virtuous circularity between both facets of 
integration. 
3 The codes are: 0. Food and live animals. 1. Beverages and tobacco. 2. Raw materials, inedible, 
except fuels. 3. Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. 4. Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes. 5. Chemical products and the like. 6. Manufactured products classified primarily by material. 
7. Machinery and transport equipment. 8. Miscellaneous manufactured items. 9. Products and 
transactions not classified elsewhere.
4 Paraguay was suspended between June 2012 and August 2013. However, it did not represent a 
change in economic terms, but in terms of its veto and voting rights. Simultaneously, Venezuela was 
accepted as a State Party, a condition of which it was suspended in August 2017. However, this 
acceptance is considered limited in economic terms by the existence of exceptions with respect to 
the regular treatment of the remaining states party. Regardless of this discussion, the admission was 
after the period considered in the study.
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The second scenario raise if the institutional advance reinforces the prior 
patterns of specialization, then the inter-industry trade with both partners 
and third market is probably strengthened. Then, the economic ties would be 
weak and the virtuous circularity debilitates due to lack of political incentives 
to move forward in the implementation of what is agreed. This last situation 
responds to a set of countries that move together or apart depending on the 
circumstances.
The first implies successive periods with deepening integration, while the 
second implies a process with comings and goings without a visible trend in 
the facts.
3. reSulTS
3.1. statistical description of the bias indexes and end-to-end analysis
Table 1 shows statistical information about the 24 series that resulted 
following expression (1) and (2).  C_ij is the complementarity index between 
economies i and j, with i≠j, and B_ij is the index of unexplained bias between 
economies i and j, i≠j (in both case, ARG: Argentina, BRA: Brazil, PRY: Paraguay, 
URY: Uruguay). 
In general, the mean values of the complementary bias have been close to 
unity. This means that it was low in both senses, for and against trade partners. 
Among the first, Paraguay-Uruguay and Argentina-Uruguay presented the upper 
averages, although their standard deviation were higher. Argentina-Brazil, Brazil-
Uruguay and Paraguay-Brazil followed them with higher values but closer to the 
unity. It is interesting to note that the favorable bias due to complementarity 
was not reciprocal, given that the mean values were less than unity in all those 
cases when we reversed the order of the partners. In fact, Uruguay-Argentina 
and Uruguay-Paraguay resulted the most adverse in average terms.
The unexplained bias showed mean values that exceed the unity in all 
cases. That is, the average values were consistent with a reduction of resistance 
to intra-MERCOSUR trade. It is notorious that Paraguay presented the highest 
values, both when taken as the origin and destination of the trade flows. 
Argentina-Uruguay’s average complementary bias was high too. However, all 
of them had the greatest standard deviation.
The average end-to-end values, this is the mean values of the period for 
each indicator by setting the partners, shows an incomplete reading of the 
geographical bias. There were notable variations in the values throughout 
the 33 years that may have several possible sources –v.g. changes in the 
political scenario, on macroeconomic conditions, or the differences in 
the degree of vulnerability to external shocks, among other factors- from 
which the correct one cannot be discerned with a univariate analysis of the 
statistics. 
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TAble 1. deScriPTive STATiSTicS
Note: ARG: Argentina, BRA: Brazil, PRY: Paraguay, URY: Uruguay.
Variable Obs Mean st. dev. Min Max
C_ARG-BRA 33 1.02 0.15 0.79 1.30
C_ARG-PRY 33 0.83 0.19 0.45 1.20
C_ARG-URY 33 1.15 0.18 0.89 1.63
C_BRA-ARG 33 0.92 0.07 0.77 1.06
C_BRA-PRY 33 0.90 0.14 0.70 1.28
C_BRA-URY 33 1.02 0.09 0.87 1.27
C_PRY-ARG 33 0.83 0.28 0.55 1.49
C_PRY-BRA 33 1.00 0.20 0.49 1.30
C_PRY-URY 33 1.16 0.26 0.79 1.94
C_URY-ARG 33 0.80 0.12 0.59 1.02
C_URY-BRA 33 0.87 0.12 0.64 1.05
C_URY-PRY 33 0.79 0.22 0.44 1.34
B_ARG-BRA 33 19.13 5.57 4.95 27.80
B_ARG-PRY 33 49.39 15.12 29.70 75.54
B_ARG-URY 33 42.80 10.11 22.55 60.57
B_BRA-ARG 33 23.08 7.19 9.67 32.85
B_BRA-PRY 33 38.81 13.42 21.03 76.74
B_BRA-URY 33 21.54 6.92 12.08 38.08
B_PRY-ARG 33 45.14 23.53 19.45 102.30
B_PRY-BRA 33 42.06 12.33 25.16 71.37
B_PRY-URY 33 64.46 68.70 16.08 274.71
B_URY-ARG 33 37.65 7.95 20.56 48.82
B_URY-BRA 33 27.96 6.81 17.60 45.57
B_URY-PRY 33 47.11 24.45 19.25 119.67
Figures 1 and 2 show the variability in both bias indexes for each binomials. 
In order to reduce the difficulty in interpretation, we created the C_MERCOSUR 
and B_MERCOSUR series computing the means per year of all C and all B 
values, respectively. Figure 1 displays the existence of adverse bias to intra-
MERCOSUR trade, explained by the lack of coincidence between the basket of 
exportable goods and the imports one. That is visible through C_MERCOSUR 
values smaller than unity (right axis) except during the period 1996-2004. 
However, a growing adaptation of the production structure of the founding 
countries is evident from time before the signing of the agreement and until 
2003, consistent with intra-regional trade. Since then, we observed the 
destruction of the average complementarity achieved.
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Figure 2 shows that this behavior was apparently reinforced by factors 
other than complementarity. There was a bias - always, in general terms - in 
favor of intra-MERCOSUR trade decidedly since the mid-1990s, reversing 
its trend thereafter. B_MERCOSUR showed a favorable break in 1997 with a 
maximum in 2004, and then changed the trend by copying the path followed 
by C_MERCOSUR.
Although the joint reading for the entire period is consistent, the indexes 
of complementarity bias and unexplained bias presented opposite behavior at 
certain times. An example is what happens during the first stage of MERCOSUR, 
from its foundation and until 1997: while the complementarity indicator 
had an upward trend, the unexplained bias indicator showed the opposite, 
resulting counterintuitive if we take into account that B_MERCOSUR would 
directly capture the geographical bias generated by the institutional progress 
of the integration process.
A possible explanation for this behavior is that the C_ and B_MERCOSUR, 
by construction, hide the variability at the binomial level. Even when setting 
the exporter (ARG-BRA, ARG-PRY, etc.) or the importer (PRY-BRA, URU-BRA, 
etc.), dissonant results are observed, that is, neither the production structures 
adapted coincidentally over time nor the governments changed their national 
regulations as agreed in MERCOSUR.
figure 1. coMPleMenTAriTy biAS index
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figure 2. unexPlAined biAS index
Note: The B_PAR-URU values from 2002 to 2006 is out of range.
3.2. multivariate analysis
Neither the interpretation of the bias indexes taking end-to-end averages 
at the level of binomials nor the description of the evolution over time of the 
cross-section average value offer a complete description of the phenomenon. 
Instead, a multivariate analysis allows us to take advantage of the time and cross-
section variability of both bias indexes at the binominal level for characterizing 
the time units. In this way, it is possible to offer a unified explanation of both 
bias indexes and describe the evolution of trade integration without forcing an 
explanation centered on a specific binomial or a particular variable. Clearly, 
this technique offers an alternative to ad-hoc periodization. 
We then used the 33 observations from each of the 24 series to characterize 
and group the years into clusters. Figure 3 shows the gain on the total within 
sum of squares by each additional cluster into which the period 1983-2015 
could be divided. According to the elbow technique5, three clusters is optimal. 
To support this, we proceeded to estimate the Gap statistic mentioned in the 
methodological section. With 100 simulated samples, in all cases the optimal 
number of clusters is three. We compare different criterions to compare the fit 
of different number of clustering options, as noted in Table 2. In bold case we 
show that the better fit is reached with 3 clusters. Finally, we used medioids 
instead of K-means clustering, and the grouping is the same for both the cases 
of 3 and 4 clusters.
5 For elbow technique, see Thorndike (1953) and Liu and Deng (2020).
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figure 3. nuMber of cluSTerS
Note: The choice is marked in dashed lines.
TAble 2. oPTiMAl cluSTer SelecTion
Criterion
Number of clusters
1 2 3 4
Variance explained 1 0.74 0.48 0.48
AIC 952 776.2 601.8 657.8
BIC 993.9 860.1 727.5 825.4
Adjusted R2 0 0.23 0.48 0.47
Note: Results obtained using Optimal_Clusters_KMeans function in the ClusterR package of R.
Then, we applied K-means clustering with three and four clusters for 
robustness analysis. Table 3 shows the periodization for three and four clusters. 
In addition, it indicates the means of the complementarity and the unexplained 
bias indexes for each year, graphed previously and called C_MERCOSUR and 
B_MERCOSUR, respectively.
The periodization with three clusters divides the period 1983-2015 into the 
following sub-periods: The sub-period 1986-1999 is shown as an intermediate 
stage between the unfavorable complementarity-biased sub-period 1983-85 
and the slightly favorable complementarity-biased sub-period 2000-2006. 
An accentuation of favorable bias is observed as a result of institutional 
efforts. However, there was a significant setback in the sub-period 2007-2015. 
Our approach characterizes and groups the years included in this segment in 
cluster 1 together with the years 1983-1985, so its average is significantly 
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lower than that of the period 2000-2006 (cluster 3). Table 4 shows the average 
values for each stage. 
When the periodization is extended to four clusters, the sub-periods 
of greater intensity and of less intensity are, respectively, 2000-2006 and 
2007-2015. Therefore, the delimitation of these sub-periods is robust to the 
number of clusters. The only difference arises in the previous chronological 
stages, with a later delimitation and coincident with the signing of the Treaty 
of Asunción. The sub-period 1983-1990 was decidedly adverse in terms of 
complementarity bias and the sub-period 1991-1999 kept the sense, but with 
an average scale very close to neutrality. Institutional efforts were favorable, 
although without substantial differences between the two stages despite the 
signing of the agreement.
TAble 3. PeriodizATion wiTh Three And four cluSTerS And AnnuAl MeAnS of b_ And c_MercoSur
YEAR 3 clusters 4 clusters B_MERCOSUR C_MERCOSUR
1983 1 2 28.01 0.82
1984 1 2 33.46 0.83
1985 1 2 30.86 0.87
1986 2 2 39.92 0.96
1987 2 2 42.57 0.84
1988 2 2 38.05 0.84
1989 2 2 37.07 0.94
1990 2 2 33.99 0.95
1991 2 3 34.24 0.96
1992 2 3 37.53 0.91
1993 2 3 37.50 0.93
1994 2 3 34.68 0.97
1995 2 3 35.80 0.99
1996 2 3 35.39 1.03
1997 2 3 30.53 1.00
1998 2 3 34.89 1.02
1999 2 3 42.38 1.00
2000 3 4 48.04 1.11
2001 3 4 51.25 1.06
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2002 3 4 59.31 1.15
2003 3 4 59.14 1.15
2004 3 4 61.30 1.05
2005 3 4 59.89 0.98
2006 3 4 50.83 0.95
2007 1 1 38.97 0.93
2008 1 1 33.58 0.89
2009 1 1 32.32 0.88
2010 1 1 29.45 0.83
2011 1 1 27.42 0.83
2012 1 1 26.64 0.83
2013 1 1 25.40 0.84
2014 1 1 26.53 0.84
2015 1 1 25.65 0.89
Note: Each number in the second and third columns identifies the cluster to which the year 
corresponding to the row belongs.
TAble 4. MeAnS for Three And four cluSTerS









Finally, figures 4 to 7 contrast the results of univariate and multivariate 
techniques by comparing the C_MERCOSUR and B_MERCOSUR and the 
evolution of bias means by cluster. Although there are coincidences in the 
general reading, the main difference arises in the precise identification of the 
limits between stages of the trade integration process. It is evident that the 
periodization following the behavior of C_ and B_MERCOSUR marks segments 
of length somewhat different and less defined6.
6 The graphs of the evolution of the indicators by binomials in contrast to the means by sub-periods 
for three periods, and the individual regressions used for computing the Tibshirani et al. (2001) 
analysis of variance are available upon request.
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For example, as commented previously and shown in the aforementioned 
graphs, there was a significant drop in the mean of the bias since 2003. 
This could have been a regime change. However, the multivariate analysis 
contradicted that impression and extended the period until 2007.
Something similar occurs with the years from 1992 to 1997. While the 
univariate analysis led to seemingly contradictory results and, therefore, 
difficult to classify, the multivariate analysis with three clusters grouped those 
years with 1985 to 1991, or identified them as a sub-period with greater 
favorable bias when four clusters are taken.
figureS 4 To 7. MeAn vAlueS Per Sub-PeriodS following TAble 4 And evoluTion of The vAlueS of c_ 
And b_MercoSur wiTh Three cluSTerS (uPPer figureS) And four cluSTerS (lower figureS)
3.3. analysis of variance
Taking the bias indexes as dependent, we performed a MANOVA analysis of 
the clusters in order to verify the existence of differences between the groups. 
As explained in the methodological section, low p-values were expected. 
The results are displayed in table 5. Following Tibshirani et al. (2001), the 
selection of the number of clusters was validated. All statistics reject the null 
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TAble 5. MAnovA
Bias Clustering Statistic F Prob>F
B 3 clusters Wilks’ lambda 0.00 25.18 0 exact
Pillai’s trace 18.80 26.04 0 approximate
Lawley-Hotelling trace 323.66 24.27 0 approximate
Roy’s largest root 192.86 32.14 0 upper limit in F
B 4 clusters Wilks’ lambda 0.00 17.26 0 approximate
Pillai’s trace 27.41 17.62 0 approximate
Lawley-Hotelling trace 346.62 16.05 0 approximate
Roy’s largest root 159.71 26.62 0 upper limit in F
C 3 clusters Wilks’ lambda 0.01 12.11 0 exact
Pillai’s trace 17.50 11.64 0 approximate
Lawley-Hotelling trace 167.22 12.54 0 approximate
Roy’s largest root 119.48 19.91 0 upper limit in F
C 4 clusters Wilks’ lambda 0.00 16.02 0 approximate
Pillai’s trace 26.67 13.34 0 approximate
Lawley-Hotelling trace 408.50 18.91 0 approximate
Roy’s largest root 281.80 46.97 0 upper limit in F
B and C 3 clusters Wilks’ lambda 0.00 13.89 0 exact
Pillai’s trace 1.95 13.37 0 approximate
Lawley-Hotelling trace 113.08 14.14 0 approximate
Roy’s largest root 87.29 29.1 0 upper limit in F
B and C 4 clusters Wilks’ lambda 0.00 16.99 0 approximate
Pillai’s trace 2.93 14.5 0 approximate
Lawley-Hotelling trace 264.63 17.15 0 approximate
Roy’s largest root 164.71 54.9 0 upper limit in F
4. diScuSSion
We compared our periodization with four proposals offered by the 
MERCOSUR literature (Bouzas 2001, Botto 2007, Caetano 2011, and Alvarez 
2011). While our proposal relies exclusively on the statistical information 
provided by trade flows, the four proposals of the mentioned authors and the 
other texts that we used to complete the period under study (Bouzas 2010, 
Botto 2015 and 2017, Caetano 2019) are based on institutional and economic 
episodes. 
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The periodization approach of the mentioned authors tend to present the 
evolution of MERCOSUR as a “two-speed” process. A priori, it differentiates 
between trade integration and institutional integration, and then identifies 
sources of change. In contrast, our proposal based on the statistical 
characterization of time units from two indicators of bias that jointly represent 
the both faces of integration. In this way, it eliminated the possibility of 
selection bias. Coincidentally, our approach and the four mentioned authors 
consider the faces of integration mutually dependent.
Table 6 shows the four periodizations proposed by the literature on the 
left of the year’s column, while our periodization is on the right. The authors 
identified each stage identified with a descriptor, e.g. Bouzas (2001) named 
“Transition period” to years 1991 to 1994.  In addition, each cell was painted 
to differentiate the degree of engagement that the authors observed in the 
partners. The lower the intensity of the colour, the more unfavorable or less 
favorable the bias for MERCOSUR. There is coincidence among them that the 
period between the Treaty of Asunción and the Ouro Preto Protocol was a 
construction phase that would result in a later trade boom.
However, there are interesting discrepancies between the periodization 
of the mentioned authors and our results. Considering three clusters, our 
methodology found no significant differences between the sub-periods 1986-
1990 and 1991-1999. While 1986 correspond to the signing of the Act for 
Argentine-Brazilian Integration, which established the PICE, 1999 coincides 
with the Brazilian crisis and the devaluation of the Real. This thirteen-year sub-
period was divided only when we take the control case with four clusters: the 
“prehistory” of MERCOSUR extended until 1990 (instead of 1985) and the 
deployment extended from 1991 to 1999. 
The multivariate analysis has divided section 2000-15 into two sub-
periods. Here we find some similarities with the reference authors that highlight 
a change in the integration program. However, our periodization is consistent 
with a discouraging reading of the process. The first of the sub-periods 
extended from 2000 to 2006, and coincided with the “new” MERCOSUR 
presented by the bibliography. However, our descriptor word is “fullness” 
because it corresponded simultaneously with the moment of greater formal 
development of integration (FOCEM, PARLASUR, Consultative Forums, etc.) 
and with the highest average levels of both geographical biases.
In contrast, the following MERCOSUR sub-period was associated 
with a regressive transformation process. The years between 2007 and 
2015 corresponded, in terms of geographical bias, with a setback to 
integration levels and trade bias similar to the prehistory of MERCOSUR 
(1983-85) if we take three clusters, or with an even greater setback when 
we considered the control case with four clusters. Phenomenally, this 
period coincides on the political level with the resurgence of the dispute 
over the “pastera” between Argentina and Uruguay, with the request of 
Uruguay -accompanied by Paraguay- to be authorized to sign bilateral 
trade agreements with third countries, with the suspension of Paraguay 
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and the admission of Venezuela as full member. While, at the trade level, 
it coincides with the context of the global crisis of 2008, the use of 
greater non-tariff barriers with each other (for example, non-automatic 
import licenses, antitrust measures, etc.) and the increase in requests for 
exceptions to the common external tariff.
5. finAl reflecTionS
We addressed the periodization of MERCOSUR’s lifetime based on a 
new approach. This approach grouped the years between 1983 and 2015, 
minimizing intra-group variances and maximizing the inter-group ones. We used 
two trade bias indexes taken by binomials for characterizing the unit of time. 
Finally, we contrasted our outcomes with those carried out by MERCOSUR 
specialists. In this way, we verified the historical coherence of the results and 
remarked the advantages of the method.
The results showed a process of accumulating asymmetric behavior in 
favor of MERCOSUR until 2006. The three clusters had increasing means 
supported by the overlap of two different forces, sometimes in contrast. The 
sub-period 1983-1985 corresponds to the prehistory of the agreement, 
and was characterized by the low complementarity and reduced political 
commitment with the strengthening of the economic ties. The sub-period 
1986-1999 revealed a significant change in trade explained by a growing 
complementarity, although with an erratic behavior in the institutional facet. 
Furthermore, the erratic character of both facets explained the sub-period 
2000-2006. Finally, we found similarity between the sub-period 2007-2015 
and the prehistorical one. That is, an adverse geographical bias explained by 
low trade complementarity and low institutional efforts. The control case with 
four clusters reinforced this description.
In conclusion, we observed a positive evolution of MERCOSUR with obvious 
internal difficulties until 2006. Initially, bilateral trade enjoyed an interesting 
impulse from the adaptation of the productive structure, which pushed 
policymakers to maintain the institutional support. However, these economic 
ties lost strength just as political support did, probably, when domestic 
problems were most urgent. In fact, the last sub-period is the result of both 
domestic problems and conflicting political relationships. 
Back to the initial question, our evidence suggest that the circumstances 
set the pace of the integration process. The partners behave as leaves that 
are piled up by the wind instead of acting as a rising and willing uniform body.
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(#) Botto (2015) characterized the period 1995-2002 as “institutional deconstruction”. While Botto 
(2017) calls 1991-2001 as the “trade stage” and 2002-15 as the “stage of productive integration” 
(##) Caetano (2019) identified, despite partial achievements, the 2004-14 as the “post-liberal 
regionalism” failure. The lower the intensity of the color, the more unfavorable or less favorable the 
bias for MERCOSUR.
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